Distributive bargaining
This is bargaining where the union and employer are in conflict. It represents a win-lose situation. Basically one side is determined to win and the other to lose. If both are unwilling to give way and find a modus viveni - then the game result is LOSE-LOSE. Conflict is endemic to bargaining - and " us and them, I trust you only as far as I can throw you" situation. It is indicative of instrumental attitudes towards work.
Alan Fox in his book "Beyond contract : work, power and trust relations", 1974 - expressed the view that in a hard fought struggle over wages - if unionised employees do not secure their objectives and are forced to accept what they regard as a poor offer - then the bargain merely represents a "best that we can get for now" position. There is no trust between employer and employee - when the bargaining power situation changes - employees will take the first opportunioty to return with fresh demands to the bargaining table.
Integrative bargaining
This is representative by productivity bargaining - an effort to secure mutual reciprocity. The establishment of trust and a joint-problem-solving orientation is essential. Each party to the bargain needs to be open and trust the other party's purpose and intentions.
The aim is to search jointly for a solution to problems and secure the best possible agreement which is based on WIN-WIN and achieving a synergy. The aim is to increase the size of the cake or income that is available to the joint undertaking. Consensus can then be reached on how the income is distributed - to management (the company in terms of investment, dividends, job security and prospects) and wages.
Of course the problem of wages being a cost is an essential difficulty as is the fact of owners wishing to see profits and an acceptable return on capital employed by the business.
readers are encouraged at this point to consider the "prisoner's dilemma" - a behavioural model from game theory which highlights a situation in which if both parties act rationally, each party's reward is less that it would have been if both acted irrationally and cooperated! The prisoner's dilemma illustrates that rational action for an individual may be not to cooperate.
Intra-organisational bargaining
Walton and McKersie point out that those at the negotiating table are briefed by and must satisfy their principals. When they identify a potential solution or reach and impass they may need to persuade their principles (members of the Board, or the mass of trade union members) that the solution or the next step in the bargaining-power struggle is one that should be taken.
Thus there is intraorganisational bargaining within the ranks on each side of the bargaining table - as much bargaining perhaps as in the negotiating room itself.
Trade union officials may actually recognise that the company would be foolish to increase its wages bill and costs any further - yet know that their members will find it hard to accept when told that all they had hoped for will not materialise. The officials may recognise that workers will never be able to recoup lost earnings by remaining out on strike. Passion and anger against the employer has fuelled irrationality. With utilitarian calculation it may be better to go back to work with a smaller increase in pay - at least that way everyone may keep their job as the company continues to trade. Individuals will receive a pay packet at the end of the week or month.
Management negotiators may find the company Board adamant about a sticking limit. Equally managers who are not participant to proceedings may take action or make public statements which inflame passions on the other side of the table.
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